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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2014 
___________ 
 
KEVIN M. MCCANN, M.D., 
                                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNUM PROVIDENT; *HARTFORD LIFE &  
ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
*(Dismissed Per Court Order dated October 12, 2017) 
 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-11-cv-03241) 
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper 
______________ 
 
ARGUED: April 26, 2018 
 
Before:  JORDAN, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  October 5, 2018) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal addresses two principal issues: First, 
whether a group insurance plan is governed by the Employee 
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001, et seq., and second, whether the physician–claimant 
was incorrectly denied his disability benefit payments. 
 
Plaintiff–appellant, Dr. Kevin McCann, is a radiologist 
certified in the specialty of interventional radiology. The 
gravamen of this appeal concerns a supplemental long-term 
disability insurance policy Dr. McCann purchased from 
defendant, Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company. 
After initially issuing payments under the policy, Provident 
terminated Dr. McCann’s disability benefits. Central to its 
decision was a determination that Dr. McCann was primarily 
practicing as a diagnostic radiologist—rather than as an 
interventional radiologist—at the time he became disabled. 
This suit followed. 
 
As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether Dr. 
McCann’s claim arises under ERISA. Thus, we first consider 
the outer bounds of an employer’s involvement in a group or 
group-type insurance plan before deciding whether the plan 
may be governed by ERISA. The Department of Labor has 
promulgated a safe harbor regulation exempting certain plans 
from the definition of an “employee welfare benefit plan.” But 
we conclude Dr. McCann’s then-employer sufficiently 
endorsed the plan under which his policy was purchased to 
render the safe harbor inapplicable. ERISA will supply the 
governing framework.  
 
As to the merits, we believe Provident incorrectly 
defined Dr. McCann’s occupation in administering his 
disability claim and that the claim must be evaluated in the 
context of his specialty—interventional radiology. We will 
remand for the District Court to consider whether Dr. 
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McCann’s medical conditions prevent him from being able to 
perform his “substantial and material duties” as an 
interventional radiologist, as required by the terms of the 
policy. 
 
I. Factual Background 
A. Dr. McCann’s Employment at Henry Ford 
Hospital and Supplemental Long-Term 
Disability Insurance Policy  
After graduating from medical school and obtaining 
certification as an interventional radiologist, Dr. McCann was 
hired by Henry Ford Hospital to serve in a two-year Graduate 
Trainee Physician Program. While there, Dr. McCann worked 
in the Hospital’s Department of Diagnostic Radiology until the 
completion of his fellowship on June 30, 1991.  
 
To Dr. McCann and other employees, the Hospital 
offered a “Base Plan” of non-contributory long-term disability 
benefits. The Hospital determined the Base Plan’s eligibility 
criteria and set the available maximum monthly benefit. As 
relevant here, the Hospital also provided certain groups of 
employees with information pertaining to supplemental long-
term disability insurance. Fellows, like Dr. McCann, who 
served in the Hospital’s Graduate Trainee Physician Program 
were eligible to purchase supplemental insurance under the 
Residents’ Supplemental Disability Insurance Plan (RSDP). 
The RSDP was funded through the purchase of individual 
policies and underwritten by Provident’s predecessor, Unum 
Life Insurance Company of America. While participants paid 
100% of policy premiums, all policyholders received a fifteen 
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percent discount based solely on their association with the 
Hospital.  
 
During Dr. McCann’s employment, Lucasse, Ellis, Inc. 
(“Lucasse”) served as the Hospital’s broker for insurance 
policies issued under the Base Plan and RSDP. Lucasse sent 
Dr. McCann a letter advertising the RSDP in 1991 and 
informing him that Provident had been chosen by the Hospital 
“to provide supplemental disability insurance to Ford 
physicians.” Joint App. at 166. The letter explained that the 
RSDP was designed to address the “single greatest concern” 
for physicians—that they may be disabled within their 
specialty. Joint App. at 168. Specifically, Lucasse’s letter 
stated: “Unlike many occupations, a doctor may become 
disabled by an injury or illness that would not preclude 
working in another occupation,” and that “[y]our program will 
state . . . that your occupation is a recognized medical specialty, 
with its own specific duties. Thus, it is possible for you to be 
disabled within your specialty while you can still be a 
physician.” Id.  
 
Thereafter, Dr. McCann spoke with a Lucasse 
brokerage agent, David Manes. After discussing with Manes a 
long-term disability insurance policy he had purchased earlier 
from a different insurer, Dr. McCann applied to Provident for 
supplemental insurance coverage in May 1991. Dr. McCann’s 
application was approved and his policy took effect on July 1, 
1991.1 Particularly relevant are the provisions relating to total 
disability, which state: 
                                              
1 At the time he became disabled, Dr. McCann’s policy 
provided a monthly benefit of $15,000.00.   
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Total Disability or totally disabled 
means that due to Injuries or 
Sickness: 
1. [Y]ou are not able to perform 
the substantial and material 
duties of your occupation; and  
2. [Y]ou are receiving care by a 
Physician which is appropriate 
for the condition causing the 
disability. We will waive this 
requirement when continued 
care would be of no benefit to 
you. 
Joint App. at 308. The policy also provides the following 
definition of occupation: 
 
[Y]our occupation means the 
occupation (or occupations, if 
more than one) in which you are 
regularly engaged at the time you 
become disabled. If your 
occupation is limited to a 
recognized specialty within the 
scope of your degree or license, we 
will deem your specialty to be your 
occupation. 
Id.  
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B. Dr. McCann’s Medical Diagnoses 
Nearly fifteen years after completing his fellowship at 
Henry Ford Hospital, Dr. McCann began employment at 
Holzer Clinic in Gallipolis, Ohio. While at Holzer, between 
2006 and 2010, Dr. McCann consulted a variety of medical 
providers for the evaluation and treatment of obstructive sleep 
apnea (OSA)2, a mildly dilated ascending aortic root 
aneurysm,3 hypertension, and obesity. These conditions form 
the basis of Dr. McCann’s Total Disability claim. 
 
First, in December 2006, Dr. Howard Linder diagnosed 
Dr. McCann with OSA. The condition caused Dr. McCann to 
experience “excessive daytime sleepiness,” and Dr. Linder 
opined that he was “probably unable to stay alert for long 
periods” at work. Joint App. at 1328–29. Dr. McCann 
underwent a sleep study later that month to evaluate the 
severity of his OSA and, based upon the results of the study, 
Dr. Linder developed a treatment plan. The plan included using 
a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine at night 
to assist with breathing during sleep.  
Shortly thereafter, Dr. McCann also began experiencing 
shortness of breath and dizziness. On April 16, 2007, an 
echocardiogram revealed his “aortic root mildly dilated at 3.71 
                                              
2 OSA “is a condition in which the flow of air pauses or 
significantly decreases during breathing while the individual is 
asleep due to a narrowing or blockage of the airway.” Joint 
App. at 4054. As a result, OSA can cause interruptions in 
breathing patterns and excessive fatigue.  
3 “An aneurysm consists of an abnormal enlargement of a 
weakened area in the aortic wall.” Joint App. at 4057. The aorta 
supplies blood pumped by the heart to the rest of the body.  
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[cm].” Joint App. at 2174. Several months later, Dr. McCann 
visited a specialist, Dr. Joseph Coselli, Chair of Cardiothoracic 
Surgery at the Texas Heart Institute at Baylor Medical Center, 
and was diagnosed with a mildly dilated aortic root aneurysm, 
hypertension, and obesity.  
 
Following his diagnoses, Dr. McCann stopped working 
at Holzer and sent Provident a notice of claim for benefit 
payments in March 2008.4 In support of the claim, Dr. Coselli 
submitted an Attending Physician Statement (APS) listing 
“restrictions” as “no lifting that ilicits [sic] Valsalva maneuver5 
otherwise no restrictions” and “limitations” as “avoid heavy 
lifting [and] avoid stress to help keep BP under control to 
prevent further dilation of aorta.” Joint App. at 810.6 Dr. 
Coselli also wrote a letter to Holzer Clinic in April, in which 
he noted Dr. McCann’s hypertension and sleep apnea put him 
“into a high risk population for risk of further dilation of his 
aorta” and recommended “tight blood pressure control, weight 
loss and undertaking an exercise regime in order to improve 
[Dr. McCann’s] overall functional capacity.” Joint App. at 
1176. Dr. Coselli further stated that “[i]n light of these 
restrictions, I feel it would be best if he was classified as fully 
disabled permanently, effective March 10, 2008.” Id. 
                                              
4 Prior to ceasing work completely, Dr. McCann reduced his 
workload on two occasions because of OSA-related fatigue.  
5 A Valsalva maneuver is a breathing technique that requires a 
forceful attempted exhalation against a closed airway. 
6 Dr. Linder also submitted an APS to Provident on July 15, 
2008, listing Dr. McCann’s diagnoses as “obstructive sleep 
apnea causing daytime sleepiness” and “excessive daytime 
sleepiness despite CPAP.” Joint App. at 1328.  
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C. Provident’s Initial Payment of Benefits 
Provident acknowledged Dr. McCann’s disability claim 
on April 4, 2008, and informed him that medical and financial 
information would be requested and reviewed to process the 
claim. Provident also interviewed Dr. McCann, both in person 
and via telephone, on numerous occasions. These interviews 
discussed Dr. McCann’s educational and employment 
background, his medical conditions, and the impact of the 
medical conditions on his medical practice.  
 
Regarding Dr. McCann’s occupational duties, 
Provident requested information from Holzer. Dr. Phillip 
Long, Vice-Chairman of Radiology, completed a job 
description form estimating that Dr. McCann worked an 
average of 60 hours per week divided among interventional 
radiology (approximately 20 hours), diagnostic radiology 
(approximately 28 hours), fluoroscopy7 (approximately 1 
hour), night call (approximately 10 hours), and paperwork 
(approximately 1–2 hours).  
 
In addition, Provident requested the Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT) codes8 related to Dr. McCann’s practice. 
Upon receipt of the codes, Provident employed a vocational 
                                              
7 Described as “[p]erform[ing] barium studies under 
fluoroscopy in standing position wearing lead apron.” Joint 
App. at 1014. 
8 CPT codes are five-digit, procedure-specific codes 
maintained by the American Medical Association used for 
reporting medical services and surgical procedures to third-
party payers.  
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rehabilitation specialist to verify the duties of Dr. McCann’s 
occupation as an interventional radiologist. To this end, David 
Gaughan submitted a report on November 13, 2008. Gaughan 
confirmed that Dr. Long’s job description, in combination with 
the CPT codes, were sufficient to conclude Dr. McCann 
performed duties related to “Diagnostic & Interventional 
Radiology prior to disability.” Joint App. at 1514. 
 
Regarding Dr. McCann’s medical conditions, Provident 
submitted Dr. McCann’s file to Dr. Joseph Davids, a board-
certified physician in internal medicine and cardiovascular 
diseases. Dr. Davids reviewed Dr. Coselli’s and Dr. Linder’s 
letters and notes as of July 2008 and concluded that “the 
prognosis for functional improvement is poor because it is 
difficult to maintain [a] level of tight BP [blood pressure] 
control while working in a stressful occupation, such as 
interventional radiology. Furthermore, an interventional 
radiologist will often perform Valsalva maneuvers during a 
procedure, which will lead to a rise in BP.” Joint App. at 1455. 
Dr. Davids also opined that evidence of good blood pressure 
control might alleviate Dr. McCann’s restrictions and 
limitations.  
 
Following this medical review and analysis of Dr. 
McCann’s financial and occupational information, Provident 
approved Dr. McCann for Total Disability payments on 
September 4, 2008.9 Provident initially issued payments with a 
Reservation of Rights, but this reservation was later 
withdrawn.  
                                              
9 Provident also paid Residual Disability benefits to Dr. 
McCann from April 1, 2007 to March 10, 2008, during which 
time Dr. McCann was working reduced hours.  
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D. Provident Reviews its Determination 
Provident reexamined Dr. McCann’s Total Disability 
status in the summer of 2009. In May, a medical consulting 
team consisting of Dr. Davids and a clinical consultant, Patricia 
Carroll, reviewed the medical records in Dr. McCann’s file. 
Davids and Carroll recommended a 24-hour blood pressure 
study, which was scheduled for July 9, 2009. The results of this 
study were forwarded to another clinical representative and Dr. 
Alfred Parisi, who concluded: 
 
[T]he systolic BP shows good but 
not ideal BP control . . . The 
[insured’s] occupation as an 
interventionalist would involve 
some pushing requirements when 
putting in a catheter and he would 
have some potential problems 
doing this. The act of pushing does 
tend to increase BP. The [insured] 
might also have increased stress 
during a difficult procedure. If the 
[insured] is an interventional 
radiologist it is reasonable that he 
would not be able to perform some 
of the interventional activities. If 
the [insured] does not perform 
much interventional radiology 
work, he should be able to perform 
many of the sedentary 
[occupational] requirements.  
Joint App. at 2043.  
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Based on Dr. Parisi’s conclusions, Provident 
representatives recommended scheduling another field 
interview and obtaining updated medical records. This 
included the records of Dr. Nabil Fahmy, Dr. McCann’s 
primary care physician. Dr. Fahmy’s notes from Dr. McCann’s 
most recent visit in July stated that he was “generally doing 
okay with no new problems,” that his “[h]ypertension [was] 
doing well, BP [was] under good control at home,” and that Dr. 
McCann was “[n]on compliant with diet and exercise 
schedule,” but taking “medications daily as recommended.” 
Joint App. at 2204.   
 
Provident also reviewed the treatment notes from Dr. 
McCann’s follow-up visit with Dr. Coselli on August 10, 2009. 
Katharine Loring, a nurse practitioner, noted that in response 
to Dr. McCann’s request that Dr. Coselli’s office  continue 
supporting his disability claims, she “discuss[ed] with him that 
his aorta is really not a size we would recommend he need 
disability and that many people with much larger aortas 
continue to work.” Joint App. at 2435. She accordingly 
suggested Dr. McCann “do just regular radiology as a way to 
continue to work but with less stress.” Id. 
 
 Dr. Coselli’s notes similarly observed:  
We discussed the terminology of 
permanent and total disability and 
we agreed to disagree regarding 
the sequencing of events. The fact 
remains that over the past two 
years following him, his aorta has 
been essentially stable. Surgery is 
not indicated at this time – the size 
13 
 
does not dictate intervention and 
although there is a 30% chance that 
he will need surgery, it may not be 
for 5, 10 or 20 years.  
Joint App. at 2434. This discussion was memorialized in a 
follow-up letter to Dr. McCann dated September 9, 2009, in 
which Dr. Coselli explained: “your aortic aneurysm has had 
only minimal increase in size since the January 2008 study, 
increasing from 4.0 cm to the current 4.3 cm,” but that “[a]s in 
the original letters to Holzer Clinic, your disability 
classification remains unchanged.” Joint App. at 2433. Dr. 
Coselli also informed Dr. McCann that while he was “happy to 
monitor [his] aorta studies, [his office was] not a medical 
practice, but surgical,” id., and that Dr. McCann should consult 
his primary care physician to coordinate his care. 
 
To this end, Dr. McCann chose Dr. David Lombardi, a 
board-certified internist, as his local primary care physician. 
Following an appointment in October 2009, Dr. Lombardi 
submitted an APS to Provident supporting Dr. McCann’s 
disability claim and identifying his primary diagnosis as 
“thoracic ascending aortic aneurysm” and his secondary 
diagnosis as OSA. Regarding job-related restrictions and 
limitations, Dr. Lombardi concluded Dr. McCann could not 
complete “work of any kind due to [his] cardiac condition.” 
Joint App. at 2389.  
 
 Around this time, Provident again reviewed Dr. 
McCann’s CPT codes for procedures performed from 2005 to 
2008. Vocational analyst Christina Lubin compared the 
percentage of interventional procedures performed to the 
percentage of diagnostic procedures. Using this data, another 
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vocational analyst concluded that “interventional charges 
accounted for 11% – 18% of total charges” and 
“[i]nterventional units accounted for 6% – 11% of total units.” 
Joint App. at 2341. Based on this information, Lubin 
concluded Dr. McCann “reasonably spent the majority of his 
time reading films and dictating interpretive reports. 
Interventional procedures appear to have been performed on an 
occasional basis.” Joint App. 2579.  
 
 Provident also assembled a second medical review team 
to review Dr. McCann’s medical files. The team included a 
clinical representative, Beth O’Brien, and Dr. Parisi. After 
reviewing all of the files, O’Brien observed that Dr. McCann’s 
aortic aneurysm was stable and that Dr. Coselli was no longer 
supporting restrictions and limitations from his condition. Dr. 
Parisi also reviewed Dr. McCann’s file and concluded that Dr. 
McCann should avoid lifting heavy objects (> 50 lbs.), restrict 
his work hours to 50 hours per week, and not work night call 
or night shift hours. This assessment was based on his finding 
that Dr. McCann’s “thoracic aneurysm was not large and 
relatively stable, that his hypertension was reasonably 
controlled on medication and he was doing well with his CPAP 
treatment for sleep apnea.” Joint App. at 2564. 
 
In addition to reviewing Dr. McCann’s files, Dr. Parisi 
contacted Dr. Lombardi to “obtain clarification of . . . Dr. 
McCann’s functional capacity.” Id. Dr. Lombardi responded 
via letter stating:  
 
I have reviewed the most recent 
letter from Dr. Coselli’s office 
dated September 2009 and prior 
letters. I have included them for 
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your review. In these letters, Dr. 
Coselli, the cardiothoracic 
surgeon, states that Dr. McCann is 
fully and permanently disabled 
due to his condition. He indicates 
that the aneurysm has increased in 
size since a prior study. I now 
oversee Dr. McCann’s general 
medical care. Given the 
documentation and 
recommendations of the 
cardiothoracic surgeon, I, 
therefore, agree and support Dr. 
McCann’s ongoing disability 
application. 
Joint App. at 2596.  
Nevertheless, Dr. Parisi maintained his conclusion. He 
noted “[Dr. McCann’s] hypertension is adequately controlled 
as evidenced by the 24 hour ambulatory blood pressure study,” 
and that the “[m]ost recent information indicates his sleep 
apnea is well controlled,”10 and he again suggested the 
limitations described above. Joint App. at 2607.  
                                              
10 Around this time, Provident requested Dr. McCann’s 
medical records from Dr. Linder going back to March 1, 2009. 
Dr. Linder provided the records, which were reviewed by a 
Provident-employed physician, Dr. Alfred Kaplan. The records 
included the results of a March 2009 sleep study. Based on this 
study, Dr. Kaplan concluded that Dr. McCann “was tolerating 
the CPAP well and was not symptomatic from the sleep 
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In light of this disagreement, Provident forwarded Dr. 
McCann’s claim file to Dr. Costas Lambrew, a designated 
medical officer, for an independent medical review on 
December 22, 2009. Dr. Lambrew’s review also concluded Dr. 
McCann was capable of performing a modified work schedule. 
This assessment was based on the fact that Dr. McCann’s aorta 
was asymptomatic and stable, Dr. Coselli’s most recent 
treatment notes, and that Dr. McCann’s “hypertension has been 
controlled, as reflected by his recorded home pressures and the 
[24-hour blood pressure study].” Joint App. at 2619. He further 
concluded Dr. McCann could perform “[s]ustained, full time 
light work as a non-interventional Radiologist, with a 
restriction of no heavy lifting, and reduction of . . .  perceived 
stress by working no more than 50 hours.” Id.  
 
E. Provident Terminates Dr. McCann’s Benefit 
Payments 
After the extensive communications with Dr. McCann 
and various medical professionals, noted above, Provident 
terminated benefit payments in December 2009. In its letter to 
Dr. McCann, Provident supported its decision by pointing to, 
among other things: the records from Dr. Coselli in connection 
with Dr. McCann’s August 10, 2009 visit; recent sleep studies 
from Dr. Linder reporting that Dr. McCann was tolerating the 
CPAP machine well; its medical reviews; and the review of Dr. 
McCann’s CPT codes.  
 
Based on this information, Provident concluded Dr. 
McCann was “able to perform the duties of [his] occupation, 
                                              
apnea[.] Consequently he was not experiencing impairing 
daytime somnolence.” Joint App. at 2559.  
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maintain a regular work schedule of up to 50 hours per week 
with no night hours or night call” and therefore was “not 
Totally Disabled in accordance with the Policy provisions.” 
Joint App. at 125. Provident noted its vocational consultant 
“concluded that the majority of [Dr. McCann’s] practice was 
diagnostic radiology which involves sitting at a computer to 
read films.” Id. Further, the letter stated Dr. McCann was not 
eligible for residual disability11 because, “[a]lthough [he] 
                                              
11 Dr. McCann’s policy defines residual disability as follows: 
Residual Disability or residually 
disabled, during the Elimination 
Period, means that due to Injuries 
or Sickness: 
1. [Y]ou are not able to do one or 
more of your substantial and 
material daily business duties 
or you are not able to do your 
usual daily business duties for 
as much time as it would 
normally take you to do them;  
2. [Y]ou have a Loss of Monthly 
Income in your occupation of 
at least 20%; and  
3. [Y]ou are receiving care by a 
Physician which is appropriate 
for the condition causing 
disability. We will waive this 
requirement when continued 
care would be of no benefit to 
you. 
18 
 
indicated that [he] previously worked 60 hours per week, [his] 
ability to work 50 hours per week would not be expected to 
cause a reduction of [his] monthly income of more than 20%.” 
Joint App. at 126. 
 
F. Dr. McCann’s Appeal 
Dr. McCann appealed Provident’s decision and, 
following the termination of his benefits, visited one new 
consulting physician: Dr. Chandra Madala, a board-certified 
cardiologist. Dr. Madala addressed a letter to Dr. McCann on 
June 14, 2010, stating his agreement with “Dr. Coselli’s letter 
to Holzer . . . . that [Dr. McCann was] fully and permanently 
disabled.” Joint App. at 2841. Dr. Madala recommended 
continued medical management of Dr. McCann’s condition 
with blood pressure control and lifestyle modification and 
noted that “[o]f particular importance is to avoid stress.” Id. At 
Dr. McCann’s request, Dr. Linder also drafted a letter in June, 
stating that Dr. McCann’s diagnosis of OSA exacerbated “his 
hypertension which is a continuing risk factor for possible 
rupturing [of] his aneurysm.” Joint App. at 2836. Dr. Linder 
further stated that “[t]reatment with CPAP certainly helps but 
does not eliminate the risk factor of contributing to [Dr. 
McCann’s] hypertension.” Id.  
 
Provident continued to review Dr. McCann’s file in 
connection with his appeal. On August 3, 2010, Provident met 
with Dr. Long to discuss Dr. McCann’s occupational duties. 
Dr. Long did not dispute Provident’s CPT code analysis, but 
when asked whether Dr. McCann was hired as an 
interventional radiologist or a diagnostic radiologist, Dr. Long 
                                              
Joint App. at 313.  
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replied “[b]oth” and explained that interventional radiologists 
do both things. Joint App. at 3148. He noted that nine 
radiologists perform diagnostic radiology at Holzer, with work 
evenly divided among the practicing radiologists, but that only 
three also perform interventional radiology, and that Dr. 
McCann would not have been hired by Holzer if he did not 
perform some interventional radiology. Dr. Long also 
explained that in the same amount of time it can take to do an 
interventional procedure, e.g., an angioplasty, he can probably 
read more than 10 MRIs. Finally, when asked whether Holzer 
would consider hiring Dr. McCann again, Dr. Long stated 
Holzer might if Dr. McCann “could work as a diagnostic 
radiologist who could also perform on-call work.” Joint App. 
at 3151.  
 
Provident also conducted another medical review. In 
September, Dr. Paul Sweeney, a board-certified internist with 
a subspecialty in cardiology, evaluated Dr. McCann’s file. In 
his review, Dr. Sweeney observed “[t]he medical record 
clearly documents an asymptomatic mildly dilated ascending 
aorta,” but that “aggressive efforts and blood pressure control, 
lipid management, and weight reduction” were still 
appropriate. Joint App. at 3198. Dr. Sweeney also concluded 
from Dr. Coselli’s office records that “there is no longer any 
valid rationale” which “would prevent Dr. McCann from 
resuming on a full-time basis his previous occupation as an 
interventional and diagnostic radiologist.” Id. Specifically, Dr. 
Sweeney found “no restrictions on standing, sitting, or 
walking. Dr. McCann can occasionally climb and operate 
heavy machinery. He can frequently twist and reach above 
shoulder level. He can continuously lift up to 10 pounds, 
frequently lift 11–20 pounds, and occasionally lift 21–100 
pounds.” Joint App. at 3199.  
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G. Provident’s Final Determination 
Following Dr. Sweeney’s review, Provident upheld its 
decision in a letter to Dr. McCann’s counsel dated September 
20, 2010. Again emphasizing review of Dr. McCann’s CPT 
codes, and the August 10, 2009 follow-up visit with Dr. 
Coselli, Provident explained that “Dr. Coselli released Dr. 
McCann to ‘regular radiology’, which is primarily what Dr. 
McCann was doing prior to his claim for disability, as 
evidenced by the CPT code review.” Joint App. at 152. While 
based on Dr. Sweeney’s conclusions, Provident concluded Dr. 
McCann could perform both the diagnostic and interventional 
components of his occupation, Provident also noted that even 
if Dr. McCann could not perform his interventional duties, 
because interventional duties accounted for a small part of his 
practice, he would not qualify for Residual Disability.  
 
In addition, Provident explained its initial payments of 
Total Disability were based on an “incorrect understanding of 
[Dr. McCann’s] occupation.” Joint App. at 155. “[D]espite the 
fact that Dr. McCann was hired by and listed by Holzer Clinic 
as an Interventional Radiologist,” the letter stated, “his CPT 
codes clearly reflect that, in the years prior to disability, Dr. 
McCann was practicing primarily as a Diagnostic 
Radiologist.” Joint App. at 153. Because the restrictions and 
limitations described by physicians (i.e., lesser work load and 
no night work) “would not prevent Dr. McCann from 
performing the substantial and material duties of his 
occupation, which were primarily diagnostic in nature,” id., 
Provident maintained its decision to terminate Dr. McCann’s 
Total Disability payments.  
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II. Procedural History  
Dr. McCann brought suit under ERISA in federal court 
seeking payment for all past due benefits and reinstatement of 
his monthly Total Disability payments. Despite citing ERISA 
as the basis for federal jurisdiction, Dr. McCann contested 
ERISA’s applicability before the District Court, arguing the 
policy was not part of the RSDP nor a separate employee 
welfare benefit plan. Alternatively, Dr. McCann argued a safe 
harbor regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor 
removed the policy from ERISA’s purview.  
 
Concluding the RSDP was an employee welfare benefit 
plan within the meaning of ERISA, and that the safe harbor 
criteria were not satisfied, the District Court asserted 
jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. The District Court further found that ERISA preempted 
Dr. McCann’s breach-of-contract claim, but that Dr. McCann’s 
claim could reasonably be construed as a claim under ERISA 
§ 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), which provides a cause of 
action for plan participants who are denied benefits.  
 
The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment as to the merits of Dr. McCann’s claim to 
benefits. Reviewing Provident’s denial of benefits de novo, the 
District Court found Dr. McCann had failed to meet his burden 
of demonstrating Provident’s determination was incorrect. The 
court reasoned Provident had not incorrectly administered its 
medical review because Dr. McCann failed to provide 
objective evidence of job-related restrictions and limitations, 
and that Provident’s determination with respect to Dr. 
McCann’s occupation was not incorrect. Furthermore, the 
court agreed with Provident that any claim for Residual 
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Disability benefits under the policy was untimely because Dr. 
McCann did not submit a claim for residual benefits before 
Provident’s final determination.  
 
This timely appeal followed.  
III. ERISA’s Applicability 
As a threshold matter, we address whether Dr. 
McCann’s policy is governed by ERISA. This question is not 
only one of jurisdiction,12 but also of practical import. “[T]he 
substitution of ERISA principles . . . for state-law principles 
can make a pronounced difference.” Johnson v. Watts 
Regulator Co., 63 F.3d 1129, 1131 (1st Cir. 1995). ERISA 
preempts parallel state law remedies—here, the breach-of-
contract claim Dr. McCann has raised against Provident. See, 
e.g., Wirth v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 469 F.3d 305, 309 (3d 
Cir. 2006). But beyond this, ERISA’s applicability also 
determines such entitlements as those to a jury trial, see Cox v. 
Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647, 650 (3d Cir. 1990), and 
punitive damages, see Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 635 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
 
                                              
12 Dr. McCann renews his challenge to ERISA’s applicability 
on appeal but this challenge does not implicate our subject-
matter jurisdiction. The parties are diverse and the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We 
therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 whether or 
not ERISA governs. But if we were to conclude jurisdiction 
derives from the parties’ diversity, state substantive law would 
govern the interpretation of Dr. McCann’s policy.  
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By its terms, ERISA applies to insurance policies 
obtained through (1) a plan, fund, or program (2) that is 
established or maintained (3) by an employer (4) for the 
purpose of providing benefits (5) to its participants or 
beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1); Donovan v. 
Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
This appeal concerns the second requirement that a plan, fund, 
or program be “established or maintained” by the employer.13 
We must interpret the U.S. Department of Labor’s safe harbor 
regulation describing when, and to what extent, an employer 
may be involved with an employee welfare benefit plan 
without establishing or maintaining it. See 29 U.S.C. § 1135 
                                              
13 On appeal, Dr. McCann challenges only the District Court’s 
determination as to the regulatory safe harbor. “Whether a plan 
exists within the meaning of ERISA is a question of fact, to be 
answered in light of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances from the point of view of a reasonable person.” 
Deibler v. United Food & Commercial Workers’ Local Union 
23, 973 F.2d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). But the interpretation of a regulation also 
presents a legal question, thus, this issue presents a mixed 
question of law and fact. We review de novo the District 
Court’s interpretation of the safe harbor criteria but will reverse 
factual findings made in connection with the criteria only if 
clearly erroneous. See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 1132 (explaining 
that the safe harbor’s applicability “may require factfinding, 
and if it does, that factfinding is reviewed only for clear error”); 
Thompson v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 95 F.3d 429, 434–5 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (describing application of the safe harbor as a 
“factual inquiry”); Pacificare Inc. v. Martin, 34 F.3d 834, 837 
(9th Cir. 1994) (applying the clearly erroneous standard to 
factual findings in this context).  
24 
 
(authorizing the Secretary to promulgate interpretive 
regulations). 
 
In relevant part, the safe harbor provides that an 
“employee welfare benefit plan” or “welfare plan” is not 
covered by ERISA when: 
 
(1) No contributions are made 
by an employer or employee 
organization; 
(2) Participation [in] the 
program is completely 
voluntary for employees or 
members; 
(3) The sole functions of the 
employer or employee 
organization with respect to 
the program are, without 
endorsing the program, to 
permit the insurer to 
publicize the program to 
employees or members, to 
collect premiums through 
payroll deductions or dues 
checkoffs and to remit them 
to the insurer; and 
(4) The employer or employee 
organization receives no 
consideration in the form of 
cash or otherwise in 
connection with the program, 
other than reasonable 
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compensation, excluding any 
profit, for administrative 
services actually rendered in 
connection with payroll 
deductions or dues 
checkoffs. 
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j). All four of the safe harbor’s criteria 
must be established for an otherwise qualified plan, fund, or 
program to be exempt from ERISA’s coverage, see Menkes v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 762 F.3d 285, 293 (3d. Cir. 2014), 
and that burden rests with the party asserting the exception. But 
a program that fails to satisfy any one criterion is not 
necessarily “established or maintained” by the employer. See, 
e.g., Johnson, 63 F.3d at 1133; Anderson v. UNUM Provident 
Corp., 369 F.3d 1257, 1263 n.2 (11th Cir. 2004); Gaylor v. 
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 460, 463 (10th Cir. 
1997); Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 976 (5th 
Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by CIGNA Corp. v. 
Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011).  
 
In the present appeal, Dr. McCann is the party who 
asserts that the safe harbor exempts his policy from ERISA’s 
requirements. Thus, he bears the burden of proof that the policy 
fulfills the safe harbor’s four criteria. Provident does not 
dispute that the RSDP was completely voluntary and that 
Henry Ford Hospital received no compensation in connection 
with the program, establishing the second and fourth criteria.14 
                                              
14 Provident asserts, however, our statement in Menkes that “no 
authority. . . suggest[s] that . . . closely related components of 
an overarching welfare benefit plan ought to be unbundled,” 
762 F.3d at 291, is fatal to Dr. McCann’s safe harbor argument. 
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We therefore consider whether Dr. McCann has established the 
remaining criteria—whether Henry Ford made “contributions” 
to or endorsed the RSDP—but find the question of 
endorsement to be the dispositive one. 
  
A. Background 
ERISA was enacted “to protect . . . the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.” 
29 U.S.C. § 1001; see also Nachman Corp. v. Pension Ben. 
Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 362 (1980) (discussing ERISA’s 
enactment and purpose). This goal manifests itself in the 
statutory text, including, for example, the fiduciary duties 
applicable to the management of both pension and non-pension 
benefits. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114. 
                                              
See also Gross v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 734 F.3d 1, 
10 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[The insured’s] argument that the safe 
harbor exception applies depends on her assumption that the 
LTD policy may be examined independently from the rest of 
Pinnacle’s insurance benefits plan.”). But in Menkes, we 
emphasized that “[a]ll of the characteristics of the Basic 
Policies and Supplemental Coverage indicate that they are not 
two separate sources of coverage, but two parts of one broader 
benefits plan,” because all policies were governed by a single 
group contract between the company and the insurer and 
because all of the information regarding benefit terms, rules, 
exclusions, and claim procedures for the policies were the 
same and contained in the same documents. 762 F.3d at 291. 
Provident points to no facts in the record which would resolve 
this factually intensive inquiry and so we will examine the 
RSDP independently from Henry Ford Hospital’s Base Plan of 
non-contributory benefits, as did the District Court. 
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 Mindful of this purpose, the Department of Labor’s safe 
harbor regulation “operates on the premise that the absence of 
employer involvement vitiates the necessity for ERISA 
safeguards.” Johnson, 63 F.3d at 1133. This is clear from the 
proposed rule’s preamble, in which the Department of Labor 
explains the safe harbor applies where “[t]he involvement of 
the employer or employee organization in such programs is so 
minimal that the program cannot be said to be ‘established and 
maintained by an employer.’” 40 Fed. Reg. 24642, 24643 (June 
9, 1975).  
 
As we interpret the Department’s safe harbor, we 
recognize that “[t]he basic tenets of statutory construction hold 
true for the interpretation of a regulation.” Burns v. Barnhart, 
312 F.3d 113, 125 (3d Cir. 2002). Where the language of a 
regulation is plain and unambiguous, we need not inquire 
further. See id. But this is not such a case and we will, 
therefore, consider the ordinary and natural meaning of the 
regulatory language within its context and the safe harbor’s 
overreaching purpose. In this case, the record is more 
developed on the issue of endorsement. Because we find Henry 
Ford Hospital’s actions sufficient to fall within the meaning of 
endorsement, we leave for another day the meaning of 
contribution.    
 
B. Whether Henry Ford Hospital Endorsed the 
RSDP 
The third criterion for establishing eligibility for the 
ERISA safe harbor requires that “[t]he sole functions of the 
employer . . . are, without endorsing the program, to permit the 
insurer to publicize the program to employees or members 
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[and] to collect premiums through payroll deductions or dues 
checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer.” 29 C.F.R. § 
2510.3-1(j). This case concerns the contours of endorsement.  
 
Beginning with the ordinary meaning of “endorse,” to 
endorse something is generally to indicate approval or support. 
See, e.g., Oxford English Dictionary 162–63 (Compact ed. 
1987) (defining “endorse” as to “vouch for” and 
“endorsement” as “approving testimony”); Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 749 (1964) (similarly defining 
“endorse” as “to vouch for” and “to express definite approval 
or acceptance of”). This aligns well with the final rule’s 
preamble, which conceptualized the third criterion as a 
“requirement of employer neutrality”—“the key to the 
rationale for not treating such a program as an employee 
benefit program.” 40 Fed. Reg. 34526, 34527 (Aug. 15, 1975).  
 
In view of this, we conclude the key inquiry for 
endorsement is whether an employer has strayed from the 
equilibrium of neutrality. “If an employer offers no welfare 
benefit plan to its employees but leaves each employee free to 
shop around,” Brundage-Peterson v. Compcare Health Servs. 
Ins. Corp., 877 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989), neutrality is 
apparent. Where the employer takes one step further, merely 
permitting an insurer to publicize the program and performing 
only ministerial tasks, the visage of neutrality remains. See, 
e.g., Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 
1213 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining the safe harbor “explicitly 
obliges the employer” to “refrain from any functions other than 
permitting the insurer to publicize the program and collecting 
premiums”); Johnson, 63 F.3d at 1137 (noting “the safe harbor 
may be accessible” where “it reasonably clear that the program 
is a third party’s offering”). But at some point, an employer’s 
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actions sufficiently compromise neutrality to an extent that 
triggers ERISA’s “uniform regulatory regime.” Menkes, 762 
F.3d at 293 (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 
208 (2004)). In identifying this point, we are aided by the 
decisions of our sister circuits. 
 
At the outset, however, we emphasize that endorsement 
may take many forms. Our inquiry is not a checklist but a 
holistic assessment of the employer’s “involvement with the 
administration of the plan.” Anderson, 369 F.3d at 1263 
(quoting Hansen, 940 F.2d at 978); see also Gaylor, 112 F.3d 
at 464 (looking to the “degree of participation by the 
employer”). While objective, this inquiry should also consider 
the viewpoint of the employee. See Thompson, 95 F.3d at 436–
37; Johnson, 63 F.3d at 1134 (finding “a communication to 
employees indicating that an employer has arranged for a 
group or group-type insurance program would constitute an 
endorsement” if it leads a reasonable employee to believe the 
program is established or maintained by the employer).15   
 
So when does an employer stray from neutrality? We 
conclude endorsement exists where there is some showing of 
material employer involvement in the creation or 
administration of a plan. As might be conveyed by the most 
natural understanding of the term, this involvement may 
manifest as an expression of encouragement. In Hansen v. 
                                              
15We note this is consistent with the Department of Labor’s 
interpretation that endorsement exists if the employer “engages 
in activities that would lead a member reasonably to conclude 
that the program is part of a benefit arrangement established or 
maintained by the employee organization.” Dep’t of Labor Op. 
No. 94–26A (1994).    
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Continental Insurance Company, for example, the Fifth Circuit 
emphasized that the employer had provided employees a 
booklet with its name and logo that “encouraged the employees 
to consider carefully participating in the group accidental death 
and dismemberment plan, as it would be ‘a valuable 
supplement to your existing coverages.’” 940 F.2d at 978; cf. 
Johnson, 63 F.3d at 1139–41 (finding no endorsement where 
the employer’s communication to employees stated the 
decision was “entirely an individual one”).16  
 
Material involvement may also constitute determining 
an insurance program’s eligibility criteria and selecting the 
insurance company. “The requirements for a safe harbor 
exception under 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–1(j) are strict,” Moorman 
v. UnumProvident Corp., 464 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 
2006), and the employer need only play a limited role in the 
creation of the insurance program for neutrality to be 
compromised.17 Where an employer selects the insurer, 
                                              
16 The Department of Labor likewise considers an employer to 
have endorsed a program where it “expresses to its members 
any positive, normative judgment regarding the program.” 
Dep’t of Labor Op. No. 94–26A (1994). 
17 This mirrors the showing courts have required outside of the 
safe harbor context for a plan, fund, or program to be 
“established or maintained” by the employer, and thereby 
subject to ERISA’s coverage. See, e.g., Gruber v. Hubbard 
Bert Karle Weber, Inc., 159 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(noting that an employer “can establish an ERISA plan rather 
easily” (quoting Credit Managers Ass’n of S. California v. 
Kennesaw Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617, 625 (9th Cir. 
1987))); Int’l Res., Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 
297 (6th Cir. 1991) (same). Unless the employer “is a mere 
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particularly as the sole provider, and limits eligibility criteria, 
these facts make the plan “a benefit closely tied to the 
employer-employee relationship.” Anderson, 369 F.3d at 1265 
(making this observation where an employer selected an 
insurer as the sole long term disability plan offered and limited 
eligibility to hourly employees); see also Butero, 174 F.3d at 
1213–14 (finding endorsement where the employer picked the 
insurer and deemed certain employees ineligible to 
participate); Moorman, 464 F.3d at 1268 (finding endorsement 
where the employer decided on at least one of the eligibility 
terms and identified the plan in its employee handbook as part 
of the company’s employee benefits). Thus, in Thompson, the 
Sixth Circuit found sufficient employer involvement “where 
the employer plays an active role in either determining which 
employees will be eligible for coverage or in negotiating the 
terms of the policy or the benefits provided thereunder.” 95 
F.3d at 436.  
 
 This conclusion echoes across other circuits as well. See 
Custer v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 417 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (ERISA plan existed where employer determined 
benefits, negotiated terms of coverage, and paid premiums); 
Gross v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 734 F.3d 1, 10 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that eligibility for a policy was not 
only tied to employment at the company, but the company also 
“determined which employees had access to that benefit. 
Consequently, both in outward appearance and internally, [the 
employer] played more than a bystander’s role”); Brundage-
                                              
advertiser who makes no contributions on behalf of its 
employees,” the establishment requirement will be satisfied. 
Gruber, 159 F.3d at 789 (quoting Credit Managers Ass’n, 809 
F.2d at 625).  
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Peterson, 877 F.2d at 511 (“An employer who creates by 
contract with an insurance company a group insurance plan and 
designates which employees are eligible to enroll in it is 
outside the safe harbor created by the Department of Labor 
regulation.”). In Johnson, the First Circuit found endorsement 
lacking only where the employer “had no hand in drafting the 
plan, working out its structural components, determining 
eligibility for coverage, interpreting policy language, 
investigating, allowing and disallowing claims, handling 
litigation, or negotiating settlements.” 63 F.3d at 1136 
(emphasis added).  
 
 Turning to the case at hand, the question of endorsement 
is close. Lucasse’s letter to Dr. McCann regarding the RSDP 
states, “[Provident] understand[s] your ability to participate in 
this plan is limited by the fact that disposable income is 
probably pretty tight. We have been able to mitigate this 
problem by achieving a plan design and pricing structure 
expressly for residents, which makes the premium affordable.” 
Joint App. at 166. This suggests Henry Ford Hospital had no 
involvement in determining the substance of Dr. McCann’s 
supplemental insurance policy or in the RSDP’s 
administration. Nonetheless, Dr. McCann has failed to 
demonstrate that a reasonable employee would view the plan 
merely as a third-party offering, and it appears that sufficient 
indicia of endorsement are present to preclude application of 
the safe harbor.  
 
 Several facts are of particular importance. First, 
residents were not presented with a menu of options or free to 
select any insurer. To the contrary, Henry Ford Hospital 
selected Provident as the sole provider of supplemental 
disability insurance for the RSDP. See McCann v. Unum 
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Provident, 921 F. Supp. 2d 353, 368 (D.N.J. 2013). The 
Hospital also acted to encourage enrollment in the RSDP and 
expressed some judgment about the plan because its broker 
explained Provident “is the industry’s leader in individual 
disability coverage for physicians” and was “chosen by the 
Henry Ford Medical Group to provide supplemental disability 
insurance to Ford physicians.” Joint App. at 166. A reasonable 
employee could conclude the Hospital was endorsing the plan 
from this language.  
 
Furthermore, the District Court found that the Hospital 
determined eligibility for the RSDP.18 See McCann, 921 F. 
Supp. 2d at 360. As noted, this is sufficient to compromise the 
appearance of neutrality because the Hospital played a material 
role in creating the RSDP. The District Court also found a 
perception of endorsement “would rise from and be fostered by 
the agreements repeatedly executed by [Dr.] McCann and the 
Hospital, wherein the Hospital agreed to provide disability 
insurance as part of its standard benefits package.” Id. at 368. 
This finding goes to the core of endorsement’s purpose—that 
the plan not be perceived as a benefit of employment.  
                                              
18 At oral argument, Dr. McCann’s counsel contested the 
origins of Dr. McCann’s policy and its relation to the RSDP. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, 10–11, McCann v. Unum 
Provident (No. 16-2014) (3d Cir. April 26, 2018); see also 
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 26 (“The Policy was not part of a 
program of benefits available to current Hospital employees or 
of the RSDP.”). But counsel fails to point to any evidence in 
the record which would suggest the District Court’s finding 
that Dr. McCann was a participant in and a beneficiary of the 
RSDP, see McCann, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 370, is clearly 
erroneous.  
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For these reasons, Dr. McCann fails to establish the safe 
harbor’s third criterion and ERISA shall provide the governing 
framework.  
 
IV. Dr. McCann’s Claim for Total Disability 
 We now turn to the substance of Dr. McCann’s claim 
for Total Disability. While ERISA governs Dr. McCann’s 
supplemental coverage, both parties agree that Provident’s 
decision to terminate Dr. McCann’s benefits must be reviewed 
de novo. Where a plan administrator is vested with the 
discretionary authority to construe the terms of a plan or 
determine benefit eligibility, we review its decisions under an 
arbitrary and capricious standard. See Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, (1989). But where, as here, 
such discretionary authority is lacking, our review is plenary. 
Id.  
 
In exercising this plenary review, our role “is to 
determine whether the administrator . . . made a correct 
decision.” Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 
(3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Hoover v. Provident Life & Accident 
Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 801, 808–09 (6th Cir. 2002)). Our review is 
not colored by a presumption of correctness and we determine 
whether the insured was entitled to benefits under the plain 
terms of their policy. Id. at 414. As noted, Dr. McCann’s policy 
defines “Total Disability” as being unable to perform “the 
substantial and material duties of your occupation.” Joint App. 
at 308. Dr. McCann’s claim for disability benefits accordingly 
raises three questions: What was Dr. McCann’s “occupation” 
at the time he became disabled? What were the “substantial and 
material duties” of that occupation? And do Dr. McCann’s 
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medical conditions prevent him from performing those duties? 
We address these questions in turn. 
 
A. Defining Dr. McCann’s Occupation 
 Beginning with the question of Dr. McCann’s 
occupation, the relevant policy language states:  
 
[Y]our occupation means the 
occupation (or occupations, if 
more than one) in which you are 
regularly engaged at the time you 
become disabled. If your 
occupation is limited to a 
recognized specialty within the 
scope of your degree or license, we 
will deem your specialty to be your 
occupation. 
Joint App. at 308.  
In terminating Dr. McCann’s benefits, Provident 
explained its initial payments were based on an incorrect 
understanding of Dr. McCann’s occupation and that while “Dr. 
McCann was hired by and listed by Holzer Clinic as an 
Interventional Radiologist, his CPT codes clearly reflect[ed] 
that, in the years prior to disability, Dr. McCann was practicing 
primarily as a Diagnostic Radiologist.” Joint App. at 153. The 
District Court agreed with this analysis, see McCann v. Unum 
Provident, No. CV 11-3241 (MLC), 2016 WL 1161261, at *34 
(D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2016), but Dr. McCann maintains the record 
undisputedly shows his “‘recognized specialty’ is 
interventional radiology, involving stressful, intrusive medical 
procedures and weekend and night call.” Appellant’s Br. at 48. 
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We therefore consider, in light of the policy’s definition, 
whether Dr. McCann’s occupation is interventional radiology 
or diagnostic radiology for purposes of evaluating his disability 
claim.  
 
As an initial matter, we address Provident’s contention 
that our decision in Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance 
Company, 344 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2003) should guide this 
analysis. There, we considered the meaning of “regular 
occupation” in an orthopedic surgeon’s disability insurance 
policy and concluded “‘regular occupation’ is the usual work 
that the insured is actually performing immediately before the 
onset of disability.” Id. at 386. But this statement was 
addressing the insurer’s decision to interpret “regular 
occupation” based on a typical work setting for any employer 
in the general economy. Id. at 385. We held that “[b]oth the 
purpose of disability insurance and the modifier ‘his/her’ 
before ‘regular occupation’” made clear the analysis had to be 
conducted based on the insured’s own occupation. Id. at 386. 
No one disputes Dr. McCann’s own occupation is the relevant 
scope of analysis. We are also mindful that Lasser, and other 
cases cited by the parties, turn on the policy language specific 
to those cases and are therefore of no application to Dr. 
McCann’s specialty-specific policy.19   
 
Turning to the policy language at issue here, we agree 
that particularly the first part of the definition—defining 
occupation as that “in which you are regularly engaged at the 
                                              
19 For example, Lasser discusses the meaning of “regular 
occupation” because the insured’s policy classified a claimant 
as totally disabled when he was “[in]capable of performing the 
material duties of his/her regular occupation.” 344 F.3d at 383.    
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time you become disabled”—supports a practical assessment 
of Dr. McCann’s pre-disability activities, similar to that in 
Lasser. But importantly, this language precedes, and is 
therefore qualified by, the concept that “your occupation [can 
be] limited to a recognized specialty.” Joint App. at 308. 
Because the record demonstrates diagnostic radiology was a 
component of Dr. McCann’s responsibilities as an 
interventional radiologist, we conclude Provident’s final 
determination regarding Dr. McCann’s occupation was 
incorrect.   
 
First, from a formalistic perspective, it is undisputed 
that Dr. McCann possesses the qualifications of an 
interventional radiologist. He is certified in that specialty.20 Dr. 
McCann was also hired by Holzer Clinic as one of three 
interventional radiologists, and, in fact, would not have been 
hired but for his ability to perform some interventional work.  
 
Functionally, it is also clear from Dr. Long’s job 
description, detailing Dr. McCann’s duties and 
responsibilities, that Dr. McCann performed at least some 
amount of interventional radiology, estimated at as much as 20 
hours per week. The District Court focused its analysis on the 
fact that “the diagnostic duties associated with his occupation 
accounted for 91% of the procedures he performed each week 
during the three and a half year period preceding [Dr. 
                                              
20 Specifically, Dr. McCann’s Statement of Material Facts 
describes his education as the “completion of a surgical 
internship, four years of study as a diagnostic radiologist, and 
board-certification as a diagnostic radiologist, followed by a 
one-year interventional radiology fellowship program.” Joint 
App. at 4053.   
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McCann’s] application for disability leave.” McCann, 2016 
WL 1161261, at *34 (internal quotations omitted). But we note 
that a purely mechanical comparison of the number of 
interventional procedures and diagnostic tasks fails to account 
for the time dedicated to each type of work. Dr. Long explained 
during Provident’s field visit that in the same amount of time 
it can take to do an interventional procedure, e.g., an 
angioplasty, he can probably read more than 10 MRIs.  
 
Even accepting that diagnostic work accounted for the 
bulk of Dr. McCann’s billing, the record makes clear that 
interventional radiologists perform diagnostic radiology. 
When asked whether Dr. McCann was hired as an 
interventional radiologist or a diagnostic radiologist, Dr. Long 
replied “[b]oth” and explained that interventional radiologists 
do both things. Joint App. at 3148. The first CPT review 
conducted by Provident produced a similar percentage ratio 
between interventional procedures and diagnostic readings, 
and these same percentages were used to support a conclusion 
that Dr. McCann performed duties related to “Diagnostic & 
Interventional Radiology prior to disability.” Joint App. at 
1514. We also note the American Board of Radiology 
recognizes a specialty in “Interventional Radiology and 
Diagnostic Radiology” distinct from a specialty in “Diagnostic 
Radiology.” See ABMS Guide to Medical Specialties 66–67 
(2018), https://www.abms.org/media/176512/abms-guide-to-
medical-specialties-2018.pdf.   
 
Thus, the interventional aspects of Dr. McCann’s 
practice cannot be cast aside from the definition of his 
occupation merely by focusing exclusively on the number of 
“units” of work Dr. McCann billed. The policy explicitly 
cabins the definition of “occupation” to an insured’s 
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recognized medical specialty, and, in fact, this was a primary 
selling point in Lucasse’s marketing materials.21 The letter 
                                              
21Specifically, Lucasse’s letter stated: 
[T]he definitions written in 
disability policies are of utmost 
importance, and may vary greatly. 
We want to assure you that 
Provident has achieved its position 
by providing the best possible 
definitions, and continually 
updating to the industry’s highest 
standards . . . . 
The single greatest concern for a 
physician is the definition of 
disability. Unlike many 
occupations, a doctor may become 
disabled by an injury or illness that 
would not preclude working in 
another occupation. Your program 
will state that you are disabled if 
“you can not do the duties of your 
occupation” without regard to your 
ability to do any other. It further 
states that your occupation is a 
recognized medical specialty, with 
its own specific duties. Thus, it is 
possible for you to be disabled 
within your specialty while you 
can still be a physician. 
This explanation of benefits is 
offered to assure you that all of the 
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represented that “your occupation is a recognized medical 
specialty, with its own specific duties,” and explains “it is 
possible for you to be disabled within your specialty while you 
can still be a physician.” Joint App. at 168 (emphasis added). 
The record reflects Dr. McCann was performing at least some 
interventional procedures—procedures a diagnostic radiologist 
would not be able to perform. Accordingly, we hold Dr. 
McCann’s occupation to be an interventional radiologist for 
purposes of assessing the merits of his claim.  
 
B. Dr. McCann’s “Substantial and Material 
Duties” 
We next turn to Dr. McCann’s “substantial and material 
duties,” having defined Dr. McCann’s occupation as his 
specialty: interventional radiology. Provident again relies on 
our decision in Lasser to argue that materiality is necessarily 
derivative of the income earned from and the amount of time 
spent performing a duty. Once again, we decline to apply 
Lasser out-of-context to Dr. McCann’s specialty-specific 
policy.  
 
Furthermore, in Lasser we considered whether night 
call and emergency surgeries were “material” to an orthopedic 
surgeon’s occupation. We concluded yes, finding the district 
court’s reasoning supported by comparing the insured’s pre-
disability earnings with his post-disability earnings from a 
reduced schedule. See 344 F.3d at 387–88. But we also 
considered the materiality question in the abstract and 
                                              
elements of planning have been 
addressed.  
Joint App. at 166–168 (emphasis added). 
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concluded those duties were material based, in part, on a labor 
market survey the insurer had conducted. Id. Even if Lasser 
were helpful to our analysis, therefore, it in no way suggests an 
analysis of pre-and post-disability earnings is the only measure 
of materiality.  
 
 On the record before us, we think Dr. McCann’s 
“substantial and material duties” are established and include 
both his ability to perform interventional procedures and his 
ability to do so on nights and weekends.22 As noted, Dr. 
McCann “would not have been hired by Holzer Clinic if he did 
not perform some interventional radiology.” Joint App. at 
3148. Dr. Long also explained during Provident’s field visit 
that diagnostic radiology was evenly divided among the 
practicing radiologists at Holzer and Dr. McCann’s 
interventional responsibilities were “on top of” his “even 
share” of diagnostic duties. Joint App. at 3149. As one of three 
interventional radiologists, Dr. McCann was responsible for 
performing all interventional procedures every third week.  
 
Regarding on-call work, Dr. Long confirmed that 
Holzer requires radiologists to perform on-call duty for 
weekends, holidays, and emergency cases and “has never hired 
a radiologist who has been unable to perform on-call work.” 
Joint App. at 3152. When asked whether Holzer would 
consider hiring Dr. McCann again, Dr. Long stated that Holzer 
might, hypothetically, if he “could work as a diagnostic 
                                              
22 Indeed, Provident’s counsel agreed at oral argument that 
working night shifts and weekends is a substantial and material 
duty of Dr. McCann’s occupation. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 35, McCann v. Unum Provident (No. 16-2014) 
(3d Cir. April 26, 2018). 
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radiologist who could also perform on-call work.” Joint App. 
at 3151 (emphasis added).  
 
Provident and the District Court place significant 
emphasis on Dr. McCann’s CPT codes and the fact that over 
82% to 90% of his income was generated from performing 
diagnostic radiology. Again, we note that Dr. McCann’s CPT 
codes do not take into account that a single interventional 
procedure can take significantly longer to perform than a 
diagnostic procedure. And to the extent Dr. McCann’s income 
was predominantly derived from his diagnostic work, dollar 
value of billings is only one measure of “substantial and 
material”—it does not eclipse all other aspects of Dr. 
McCann’s occupation, particularly when Dr. McCann’s policy 
defines his occupation as limited to his specialty. The record 
makes clear that diagnostic radiology is one component of an 
interventional radiologist’s specialty, but not the only 
component. We will not define Dr. McCann’s occupation and 
its “substantial and material duties” solely by counting up 
billing units.    
 
C. Dr. McCann’s Ability to Perform his 
“Substantial and Material Duties” 
One question remains: whether Dr. McCann’s medical 
conditions prevented him from being able to perform the 
substantial and material duties of his specialty, either by 
rendering him physically unable or by so limiting his 
availability that he was precluded from continuing his practice 
as an interventional radiologist. On this question we find a 
dispute of material fact, which we remand for the District Court 
to consider.  
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 The record demonstrates some level of consensus on 
this question. Dr. Davids concluded “the prognosis for 
functional improvement is poor because it is difficult to 
maintain [a] level of tight BP control while working in a 
stressful occupation, such as interventional radiology.” Joint 
App. at 1455. Dr. Parisi concluded “[i]f [Dr. McCann] is an 
interventional radiologist it is reasonable that he would not be 
able to perform some of the interventional activities.” Joint 
App. at 2043. Dr. Lambrew similarly concluded McCann could 
perform “[s]ustained, full time light work as a non-
interventional Radiologist,” Joint App. at 2619, and nurse 
practitioner Loring’s notes suggest McCann “try to do just 
regular radiology,” Joint App. at 2435. 
 
But Dr. Sweeney’s most recent report concluded 
“[t]here are no limitations on function supported” which 
“would prevent Dr. McCann from resuming on a full-time 
basis his previous occupation as an interventional and 
diagnostic radiologist.” Joint App. at 3198-99. This raises 
enough of a factual issue to warrant remand. 
 
V. Dr. McCann’s Claim for Residual Disability 
 We also remand for the District Court to consider Dr. 
McCann’s claim for Residual Disability. The court found this 
argument untimely because the claim was filed after 
Provident’s final determination and emphasized that to 
consider Residual Disability in the first instance would “thwart 
ERISA’s underlying objective to promote the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies.” McCann, 2016 WL 1161261, at *35. 
While the doctrine of exhaustion undoubtedly furthers 
numerous sound policies, we think Dr. McCann’s failure to 
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exhaust the Residual Disability claim can be excused in this 
instance.  
 
 Exhaustion, in the ERISA context, is not a rule of 
jurisdiction. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 
279 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, exhaustion is “a judicially-crafted 
doctrine” placing “no limits on a court’s adjudicatory power.” 
Id. While traditionally the exhaustion requirement is strictly 
enforced, we have recognized an exception where “resort to the 
administrative process would be futile.” Berger v. Edgewater 
Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Price, 501 
F.3d at 279 (“[T]he failure to exhaust will be excused in cases 
where a fact-sensitive balancing of factors reveals that 
exhaustion would be futile.”). 
 
The principle of futility lends itself to this case. 
Provident addressed Residual Disability in its December 2009 
letter terminating benefits and in its September 2010 letter 
denying Dr. McCann’s appeal. The 2009 letter states, for 
example: “Based on our review of you [sic] medical conditions 
we have determined that you are no longer Totally Disabled or 
Residually Disabled in accordance with the terms of your 
policy.” Joint App. at 124. Provident also explained: 
 
Although you indicated that you 
previously worked 60 hours per 
week, your ability to work 50 
hours per week would not be 
expected to cause a reduction of 
your monthly income of more than 
20% as required by the terms of 
Residual Disability. As such, you 
45 
 
are not Residually Disabled in 
accordance with the policy terms. 
Joint App. at 126. In the 2010 letter, Provident continues to say 
“it was determined [Dr. McCann] can perform the duties of his 
occupation, and therefore, was not Totally or Residually 
Disabled.” Joint App. at 149. Based on this language, Dr. 
McCann could reasonably have been under the impression that 
Provident was considering both types of disability claims in its 
review or that raising a Residual Disability claim would be 
futile. 
 
Regarding ERISA’s underlying objectives, we have 
recognized that exhaustion helps to reduce frivolous lawsuits, 
promote consistent treatment of claims, and to minimize the 
costs of settlement. See Prince, 501 F.3d at 279. Exhaustion 
also “has the salutary effect of refining and defining the 
problem for final judicial resolution.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). These objectives are important, 
but Dr. McCann’s claim for Residual Disability is based on a 
medical condition Provident has already considered and 
approved for Total Disability and, as such, the traditional 
purposes of exhaustion are less compelling here. Particularly 
in light of Provident’s consideration of Residual Disability, 
both in its initial determination and in response to Dr. 
McCann’s appeal, we conclude the doctrine should not be 
applied without regard to the particular facts of this case.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s January 31, 2013 determination as to ERISA’s 
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applicability but will vacate its March 23, 2016 grant of 
summary judgment for defendant-appellee and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
